Lu Xinhong:The Train of Thought, Principles, and Paths for Industrial Cooperation Among China, Japan, and South Korea under the New Situation

—by Lu Xinhong

 

【Abstract】 Against the backdrop of an accelerating adjustment in the international political and economic landscape, industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea faces various challenges, including decoupling and restrictions on high-tech industry collaboration. The prolonged strategic competition between China and the United States will continue to exert sustained pressure on China's industrial upgrading. In this context, seeking new ideas and strategies for industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea becomes significant.

 

This article, by reviewing the existing industrial development patterns among China, Japan, and South Korea, analyzes the new challenges and opportunities facing industrial cooperation in the current situation. It proposes ideas, principles, and paths to promote industrial cooperation among the three countries in the new circumstances. China, Japan, and South Korea should jointly maintain the stability of their economic and trade relations. The basic principle should be "industrial complementarity and differentiated development," promoting cooperation between China and Japan and South Korea, enhancing strategic ties and shared interests, and preventing decoupling.

 

There is a need to break free from the constraints of traditional cooperation models, nurture and strengthen new points of cooperation growth, and focus on promoting industrial cooperation in areas such as semiconductors, automobiles, digital economy, green and low-carbon technologies, health and elderly care, and people-to-people  exchanges. It is essential to deepen the integration of the industrial chains among China, Japan, and South Korea, fully leveraging the high-end advantages of Japanese and South Korean industries in the global value chain. Cooperation in high-tech industries should drive the transformation and upgrading of Chinese industries, enabling them to ascend to the high-end of the global value chain.

【Key Words】 China-Japan- South Korea Industrial Cooperation, RCEP, and East Asian Production Network.

 

【About the Author】Lu Xinhong, Researcher of the Department of World Economy Studies, China Center for International Economic Exchanges

 

Introduction

Under the unprecedented changes of the century, China's development faces new opportunities and challenges. It is necessary to accelerate the establishment of a new development pattern, enhance the level of openness, deeply integrate into the global economy, and form a closely-knit and stable global economic circulation system (Liu He, 2020). The formation of a new development pattern is related to factors such as the era's background, domestic and international environments, and development conditions. The intertwining dynamics of international changes and China's construction of a new development pattern are driving the need for new requirements in high-level international cooperation (Han Wenxiu, 2021; Yang Changyong, 2022).

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China reiterated the policy of maintaining friendly mutual trust and interest integration with neighboring countries. The surrounding region is crucial for China's survival and development. China, Japan, and South Korea, as natural neighbors, share geographical proximity, cultural similarities, and a long history of economic and trade cooperation. This has led to the establishment of a closely interconnected East Asian industrial chain and supply chain cooperation network. The cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea not only plays a crucial supporting role in the East Asian production network but also holds significant influence over the global production network. Strengthening industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea under the new circumstances is of great importance.

 

 

China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation possesses multiple advantages. Examining the foundation of industrial cooperation, the close economic and trade collaboration among China, Japan, and South Korea has solidified the basis for their industrial cooperation. Factors such as economic complementarity, mutual interdependence, government cooperation platforms, the demand for mutually beneficial outcomes, regional economic integration, and the promotion of RCEP have elevated China-Japan-South Korea cooperation to new heights (Bai Wenjing, 2023). From the perspective of industrial investment, China-Japan-South Korea industrial investment cooperation remains close. Even in the face of global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, China-US tensions, and the Ukraine crisis, industrial investment cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea continues to grow steadily (Zhang Xueling, 2023). Considering industrial complementarity, the differentiated division of labor in the global value chain effectively promotes the upgrading and optimization of each other's industries, establishing a mutually beneficial relationship (Xu Bo and Pang Deliang, 2022).

 

In the face of new challenges and opportunities, China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation is encountering a shifting global landscape. Factors such as the rise of anti-globalization sentiments, intensified geopolitical competition between China and the United States, the prolonged impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the ideological and fragmented trends in global industrial chain and supply chain awareness, increased risks of global economic stagnation, and heightened geopolitical risks such as the Ukraine crisis are accelerating the adjustment of the international order (Xu Zhanchen, Lu Xinhong, etc., 2022).Countries are prioritizing political and security considerations over economic development. Japan and South Korea have tightened their economic and trade policies towards China, causing disruptions in foreign trade and cooperation with foreign capital. Japanese companies are expediting the implementation of the "China + 1" policy, while there is a trend of Korean companies relocating back to their home country. These developments increase the risk of decoupling and disruptions in the China-Japan-South Korea industrial chain and supply chain, posing challenges to the security of China's industrial chain and supply chain (Lu Xinhong, 2020). In certain strategic emerging industries, there is a landscape of technological and market competition. The industrial division of labor is transitioning from vertical specialization to horizontal specialization. Restrictions on high-tech exports from Japan and South Korea to China are limiting the upgrading of China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation and regional industrial chains (Liu Wen, 2021).

 

Under the impetus of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, there have been profound changes in global technology and industry, leading to dynamic adjustments in the global production layout. We are entering a stage of interactive technological and business competition (Wang Liyong, Yang Faqiong, 2021). The new technological revolution, industrial transformation, and rapid developments in areas such as the Belt and Road Initiative, digital economy, green economy, and the semiconductor industry bring new opportunities for cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea (Fang Xiaoxia, 2020). The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with its implementation, further accelerates the eastward shift of global industrial chains and supply chains, giving rise to new industries, new forms of business, and new models. This presents potential opportunities for sensitive industry cooperation within the RCEP framework for China, Japan, and South Korea (Lu Xinhong, 2022; Zhang Xiaojing, Tu Jiajia, 2023).

 

In the new situation, China, Japan, and South Korea need new ideas and paths for industrial cooperation. Guided by the principle of "industrial complementarity and differentiated development," it is essential to promote industrial cooperation between China and Japan and South Korea. This involves strengthening strategic ties and intertwining interests, deepening the integration of industrial chains among China, Japan, and South Korea, and focusing on promoting cooperation in industries such as semiconductors, automobiles, the digital economy, green and low-carbon technologies, health and elderly care, and humanistic exchanges. Leveraging the magnetic effect of the vast Chinese market, expanding the space for China-Japan-Korea industrial cooperation, and driving China's industrial transformation and upgrading through collaboration are crucial. This approach aims to enhance China's industrial development level and expand opportunities for industrial upgrading. Additionally, fully utilizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to strengthen trilateral and regional industrial cooperation is essential for maintaining the security and stability of regional and global industrial chains and supply chains (Wang Xiaobo, 2020). Simultaneously, there is a need to accelerate efforts to secure, strengthen, extend, and complement supply chains domestically. This involves rapidly ascending to high-value-added segments of the global value chain, continuously enhancing the global competitiveness and attractiveness of industries, and providing crucial support for the smooth operation of global industrial chains and supply chains (Kang Yi, 2023).

 

1. The new trend of integrated development in the industries of China, Japan and South Korea

China, Japan, and South Korea exhibit complementary advantages in their industries, fostering deep integration in industrial chains and supply chains. This integration has led to rapid growth in bilateral trade and two-way investments, driving increasingly close cooperation within the East Asian production network among China, Japan, and South Korea. This collaboration plays a significant role in fostering prosperity in East Asia and contributing to the stability of the global economy.

 

1.1 Deep Integration of China-Japan-South Korea Industrial Chain and Supply Chain

Bilateral trade and investment between China, Japan, and South Korea are primarily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, driving a deep integration of the industrial chain and supply chain among the three countries.

 

In the trade sector, China's top four categories of imports from Japan include electrical and mechanical products, transportation equipment, optical and medical products, and plastic products, accounting for approximately 70% of the total. According to Harmonized System (HS) codes, imports from Japan in chapters 84 (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances; parts thereof) and 85 (electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles) together constitute around 50%, showing a slight downward trend. China's top three categories of exports to Japan are electrical and mechanical products, textiles and raw materials, and optical and medical products, accounting for over 50%, with electrical and mechanical product exports comprising over 40%, showing a slight decline. China's top four categories of imports from South Korea include electrical and mechanical products, chemicals, plastics, and optical and medical products, accounting for over 80%, with electrical and mechanical products comprising over 65% and showing an upward trend. China's top three categories of exports to South Korea are electrical and mechanical products, non-ferrous metals and products, and chemical products, accounting for over 52%, with electrical and mechanical products comprising around 42%, representing a decrease of approximately 4 percentage points compared to pre-COVID-19 levels. (Data Source: Compiled by the author based on information from Wind)

 

In the investment domain, bilateral investments between China, Japan, and South Korea also predominantly focus on the manufacturing sector. In 2020, Japanese investments in the manufacturing sector accounted for 64.8% of the total investment. Manufacturing investments witnessed a year-on-year decline of 31%, with transportation machinery and equipment investments decreasing by 22.4%, general machinery and equipment declining by 70.1%, and electrical machinery and equipment dropping by 41.0%. Non-manufacturing investments, on the other hand, saw a year-on-year growth of 7.2%. Within this category, investments in wholesale and retail businesses increased by 63.8%, reaching 317.9 billion yen, while the financial and insurance sector grew by 43.1%. [Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO): "Japan's Investment in China Report," JETRO website, July 2021.]

 

South Korean investments in China primarily focus on intermediate goods and components for semiconductors and new energy vehicles. Notable companies such as Samsung, SK, LG, and Hyundai have engaged in substantial investments in China. The investments made by Japanese and South Korean companies in China have played a crucial role in the development of Chinese industries and technological progress. It has also allowed Japanese and South Korean companies to gain significant returns in the evolving Chinese market, contributing to the mutual complementarity and collaborative success of the China-Japan-South Korea industrial chain and supply chain.

 

Chinese investments in Japan are concentrated mainly in projects related to automotive electrification, the internet, and emerging sectors such as cross-border e-commerce, mobile payments, and the sharing economy, along with new energy technologies. Companies like iFlytek, BYD, and SVOLT Energy Technology have entered the Japanese market. Chinese investments in South Korea mainly focus on the digital economy and green investments, particularly in areas such as cross-border e-commerce and clean energy. Platforms like Alibaba, JD.com, and Tencent have established legal entities or institutions in South Korea, with some companies participating in local clean energy and power-related investment and acquisition projects.

 

1.2 The Gradient Gap in China-Japan-South Korea Industries is Gradually Narrowing

In the early 1980s, China began participating in the East Asian international division of labor system, gradually forming a pattern where Japan led the East Asian economic development, and a vertical industrial division of labor system, characterized by "technology-intensive and high value-added industries—capital and technology-intensive industries—labor-intensive industries." In this industrial chain composition, Japan and South Korea were positioned at the middle to high end, while China was positioned at the middle to low end. With the rise of new-generation information technology and industrial revolutions, China's industrial structure continued to optimize and upgrade. Advantages in emerging industries such as digital economy, green and low-carbon, and high-end equipment manufacturing became increasingly evident. As a result, the industrial gradient gap between China and Japan-South Korea is gradually shrinking. China is ascending towards the middle to high end of the global industrial chain, driving the transformation of the China-Japan-South Korea vertical division of labor system into a more horizontal division of labor system, and expanding the space for industrial cooperation.

 

Currently, competition and cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea in areas such as semiconductors, automobiles, healthcare, intelligent manufacturing, and digital economy are intensifying. Each country possesses unique strengths in industrial development, and they are progressing towards synchronized and differentiated development. There is an increased emphasis on cooperation in high-tech fields and resilient collaboration in industrial chain and supply chain to safeguard the stability of East Asian and global industrial chains and supply chains.

 

Given the escalating uncertainty and instability in the global economy, it is imperative for China, Japan, and South Korea to strengthen cooperation to jointly address risks and challenges. Collaboratively stabilizing regional industrial chains and supply chains holds significant importance for regional and global economic stability. Particularly with the deeper implementation of the RCEP and the advancement of the upgraded version of the China-Korea Free Trade Agreement, various cities such as Qingdao, Tianjin, Dalian, Shanghai, Suzhou, Chengdu, and Beijing have established Sino-Japanese industrial parks or innovation demonstration zones. The construction of four major Sino-Korean industrial parks in Yancheng (Jiangsu Province), Yantai (Shandong Province), Huizhou (Guangdong Province), and Sinwoljin in South Korea is accelerating, forming a development pattern where industries from China, Japan, and South Korea are intertwined and interconnected. Looking ahead, the space for China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation is becoming broader. Cooperation should be expanded in areas such as addressing global climate change, promoting low-carbon and green initiatives, developing the digital economy, and collaborating on fiscal and financial matters, healthcare, and elderly care, as well as industrial chain and supply chain, to narrow the industrial gradient and achieve higher-level mutual complementarity and mutual benefit.

 

2. New Challenges Facing China-Japan-South Korea Industrial Cooperation

The accelerated adjustment of the international economic landscape and the swift reconstruction of global industrial and supply chains are presenting new trends in localization, friend-shoring, and near-shoring layouts. This brings significant instability to China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation, emphasizing the need for new strategies and approaches. Since October 2021, there have been changes in the governments of Japan and South Korea, with the administrations of Fumio Kishida and Yoon Suk-yeol respectively adjusting their economic policies towards China. This has demonstrated a tendency towards a "lean towards the United States and containment of China," reflecting a inclination to strengthen precautions against China in economic and trade policies, and revealing aspects of aligning with the United States against China in critical industrial chain and supply chain aspects. This poses challenges to China-Japan-South Korea industrial cooperation in the face of new changes in the international landscape.

 

2.1 The evolving international political and economic landscape is strengthening the alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

The evolution of the international political and economic landscape has intensified the formation of alliances, with the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance strengthening. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adjustment of the world economic order, profoundly altering the existing global division of labor and cooperation patterns. The power dynamics between developed and emerging economies have undergone changes. The Asia-Pacific region has become the focal point of global geopolitical competition and geo-economic games. Currently, there is an increased risk of global economic stagnation, a slowdown in international trade and investment, tightening global financing conditions, and a sustained weakening of economic recovery momentum. The asynchronous implementation of epidemic prevention and control policies and macroeconomic policies by various countries has led to asynchronous economic development, resulting in a continuation of the pattern of global differentiated and uneven recovery.

 

The Escalation of the Ukraine Crisis Intensifies the Evolution of the International Order, Putting Pressure on Northeast Asia and China-Korea Economic Cooperation.

The escalating crisis in Ukraine has intensified the evolution towards the “campification” of the international order, profoundly shaking the post-war "peripheral-center dependency system" with the U.S. and the West at its core. This will have far-reaching consequences for the situation in Northeast Asia, and the process of economic globalization will be disrupted by camps based on geopolitical security considerations.The NATO summit in Madrid, for the first time, regarded China as a "systemic challenge" and invited Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, planning to establish a liaison office in Japan, positioning Japan and South Korea as vanguards for NATO's entry into the Asia-Pacific region. The continued eastward expansion of NATO and the "Indo-Pacificization" and "globalization" of NATO's development will intensify strategic conflicts between the U.S. and its allies and China and Russia in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, accelerating the evolution of the international order towards "campification."

 

The intensification of the U.S.-China rivalry is affecting the nerves of the European Union, Japan, India, South Korea, and other countries (regions), forcing them to make choices and strategic adjustments. The economic interests and relationships have become more complex. The United States views China as its "most significant strategic competitor," escalating its comprehensive strategic suppression and containment of China. U.S. policy towards China has shifted from the dual-track approach of "engagement + containment" since the establishment of diplomatic relations to a policy of "comprehensive strategic competition." The U.S.-China rivalry, from the initial trade war and technological decoupling, has expanded to strategic competition, ideological struggle, and systemic competition. U.S.-China relations have entered a stage of competition and confrontation. Especially under the backdrop of the U.S. implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy and strengthening the U.S.-South Korea alliance, the new governments in Japan and South Korea have shown signs of strengthening precautions against China. They are joining the anti-China circle led by the U.S. in core industrial chain and supply chain areas, causing concerns for China. Mishandling of these developments is bound to pose significant challenges to bilateral economic and trade cooperation. The relationships between major powers are becoming increasingly complex amid intertwined and intricate interests.

 

2.2 United States Accelerates the Promotion of Global De-Chinafication of Industrial Chain and Supply Chain

In recent years, influenced by significant factors such as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine crisis, and the China-U.S. rivalry, the global industrial chain and supply chain structure have shown a trend toward localization, friend-shoring, and near-shoring. With the signing and implementation of regional cooperation agreements such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the global value chain network system has shifted from the "North America-Europe-Asia-Pacific" bloc of 2000 to the "North America-Europe-East Asia" bloc. China has replaced Japan as the core of the East Asia bloc, further solidifying the global industrial chain pattern with a " three pillars" structure. Currently, under the impact of these three major factors, the competitiveness and security of industrial chain and supply chain have become strategic priorities in the competition among major powers. Western countries, particularly the United States, have implemented strategies to revitalize their manufacturing industries, accelerating the relocation of industrial chains and supply chains to their own countries and supporting domestic companies in moving out of China. For example, the U.S. has successively introduced policies encouraging the relocation of manufacturing, Europe has launched the "European Industrial Renaissance" plan for reindustrialization, Japanese companies are speeding up the implementation of the "China+1" strategy, and South Korea has announced the "Materials, Components, and Equipment 2.0 Strategy" to promote the relocation of manufacturing. The global industrial chain and supply chain structure is undergoing rapid reshaping. At the same time, the governments of Japan and South Korea are encouraging Japanese and Korean companies in China to return or relocate. While companies whose primary consumer market is China are not likely to experience a significant industrial shift, those not primarily focused on the Chinese market, especially manufacturing companies, are showing a clear trend of relocation. Newly added investments from Japan and South Korea in China show a tendency towards light assets. In terms of the layout of new industries, new formats, new models, and new areas, Japanese and Korean companies may prioritize considerations outside of China. Competition with Chinese companies in the related upstream and downstream sectors, as well as in the development of industry, academia, and research, is likely to intensify.

 

The escalation of competition between China and the United States is leading to the ideological shaping and "de-Chinafication" of global industrial chains and supply chains. The United States is driving the establishment of a new industrial chain alliance with Japan, Australia, and India, forming a technology alliance to counter China. It has introduced a new version of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), aiming to construct an industrial chain and supply chain system in critical areas that excludes China, elevating the status of rule competition against China. In the future, the East Asian industrial chain may be replaced by the IPEF, and the international division of labor pattern may shift towards a three-tier structure involving the IPEF, the U.S.-Europe axis, and the Middle East and Africa. Guided by shared values with the United States, Japan and South Korea are actively joining supply chain alliances led by the United States. As founding members of the IPEF, they are considering participation in the Chip 4 Alliance and enhancing cooperation with the United States in terms of investment reviews and export controls, particularly in high technology. Influenced by these developments, Japanese and Korean enterprises are concerned about the impact of potential economic "decoupling" between China and the United States. This has led to a lack of confidence in investment in China and an acceleration of diversifying the layout of their industrial chain and supply chain. Some portions of these chains are being reshored or relocated to countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, contributing to the growing trend of "decoupling" in the industrial chains and supply chains of China, Japan, and South Korea.

 

2.3 The economic policies of Japan and South Korea toward China have changed from "hedging between China and the United States" to "pursuing the United States to restrain China".

2.3.1 Japan's economic policy adjustment towards China is constrained by the United States, but it will also adjust it out of its own needs to maximize its interests, which reflects Japan's strategic thinking and policy framework of hedging on multiple fronts and maintaining a balance between the United States and China.. Since the Sino-US trade friction in 2017, Japan has not fully followed the Sino-US trade war policy initiated by the United States, but has continued the policy of contact and cooperation with China, while actively participating in the "Belt and Road" third-party market cooperation, and jointly promoting the signing of RCEP in 2020. Since the Biden administration came to power in 2020, it has put forward the concept of alliance of values. Japan's economic and trade policy toward China has shifted to strengthening prevention in the economic field of China and implementing the economic security bill, and its overall policy toward China has become negative, whether it is in the fields of bilateral cooperation such as decoupling of industrial chain and supply chain, technological blockade, corporate relocation, high-tech personnel exchange, and speech orientation. Or join the United States, Japan, India and Australia Quartet mechanism, Blue Dot network plan, Indo-Pacific strategy and other regional strategies, as well as with the United States and Western countries to build science and technology alliance, chip alliance, etc., have taken policies and actions to cooperate with the United States to contain China. These measures have led more and more Japanese companies to accelerate the implementation of the "China +1" strategy, moving part of the industrial chain supply chain back to the mainland or to Southeast Asian countries and regions such as Vietnam and Myanmar, and accelerating the diversified layout of the industrial chain supply chain. According to the statistics of the Bank of Japan, Japan's cumulative investment in ASEAN in 2020 is 27.6 trillion yen, and its cumulative investment in China is 14.4 trillion yen in the same period.

 

South Korea's economic policy toward China has undergone adjustments by adopting a stance of ambiguity and maximizing its self-interests. In May 2022, when Yoon Suk-yeol was elected as the President of South Korea, his tough stance on China during the campaign cast a shadow over China-South Korea relations. In late May, President Biden chose South Korea as his first stop during his first Asia tour, increasing efforts to strengthen ties. Subsequently, South Korea announced an accelerated deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system, the establishment of a NATO liaison office, and joint efforts with the United States and Europe to establish a "technology blockade mechanism against China." South Korean government officials have stated their intention to decouple from the Chinese economy and accelerate integration into the U.S.-led Western camp, reflecting a shift in South Korea's attitude toward China. While South Korea claims that this shift does not imply a turn towards anti-Russia or anti-China policies, its policies are increasingly aligned with those of the United States. South Korea actively demonstrates its willingness to follow the United States, cooperating with the U.S. to strengthen high-tech exports control against China in certain key industries and moving closer to NATO in some strategic areas. The growing concerns among South Korean enterprises about the potential "economic decoupling from China" have intensified, exacerbated by the disruptions caused by the fluctuating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the China-South Korea industrial chain and supply chain. It is anticipated that South Korean companies will temporarily slow down investments in China and consider accelerating the relocation of industries from China to Southeast Asia and other regions. This is expected to further impact China-South Korea industrial cooperation.

 

2.3.2 The industrial policies of Japan and South Korea are undergoing a shift from a strategy of "cooperative competition" to one of "competitive vigilance." In the case of Japan, there has been a notable adjustment in industrial policy trends. In recent years, Japan has continuously optimized its global layout of industrial chain supply chains through policy formulation and strategic guidance, witnessing trends towards the localization and ideological shaping of industrial chain supply chains. For instance, in semiconductor policy, Japan introduced the "Semiconductor Industry Urgent Strengthening Plan" in 2021, aiming to triple semiconductor output by 2030. In 2022, Japan enacted the "Economic Security Promotion Act," enhancing economic security coordination with Europe and the United States, reducing economic reliance on China, and focusing on stabilizing the supply chain of specific critical materials, including semiconductors, within its borders. This involved pre-screening for 14 critical infrastructure equipment sectors such as electrical and financial, promoting collaborative research between the government and private sectors in cutting-edge technologies, and keeping certain patents confidential. Furthermore, specific rules for supporting the semiconductor industry were formulated, promising subsidies for newly established factories with a requirement for continuous production for ten years. Japan aims to address the shortage of engineers by setting up relevant majors in universities to cultivate professional talents and enhance industrial competitiveness. It is estimated that Japan will face a shortage of 35,000 engineers over the next ten years. Under policy guidance, Japanese companies are increasing investments in the semiconductor sector. Sony and TSMC have partnered to establish a factory in Japan, while Kioxia, in collaboration with Western Digital, actively invests in onshore facilities. Additionally, Renesas Electronics responded to the call by investing in onshore facilities. Simultaneously, Japan is intensifying collaboration with the United States for the research and development of new semiconductor technologies, establishing an international cooperative framework in the semiconductor field. In the automotive industry policy, Japan is steering the development of the new energy vehicle industry through national goals. In 2021, Japan proposed to prohibit the sale of gasoline cars by 2035, aiming for 100% of new vehicles sold domestically to be electrified. Over the years, Japan has continued to provide tax incentives and subsidies for new energy vehicles, strongly supporting the development of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In pharmaceutical industry policy, Japan is promoting a shift in pharmaceutical research and development from imitation innovation to innovative research and development of original drugs. The "Economic Security Promotion Act" categorizes pharmaceuticals and original drugs as specific critical materials, ensuring their stable supply domestically.

 

Trends of South Korea's Industrial Policy. In 2021, South Korea introduced the "Tax Reform Bill," designating semiconductor, secondary batteries, and vaccines as national strategic technology projects. The government increased tax incentives and financial support for these projects. South Korea continues to accelerate its investment layout in the semiconductor sector, aiming to secure a high-end position in the industry chain. South Korea ranks second in the global semiconductor market after the United States, holding nearly 20% of the global market share in 2019. Major South Korean semiconductor companies such as Samsung and SK Hynix hold two of the five top positions globally. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix announced plans to invest 51 trillion Korean won over the next ten years. In 2021, South Korea unveiled the "K-Semiconductor" strategy, providing tax support to semiconductor companies with the goal of becoming a comprehensive semiconductor powerhouse by 2030. In 2022, South Korea planned to implement a $47.3 billion "Chip Act" to expand domestic chip manufacturing capacity, creating the world's largest chip manufacturing production base. The investment over the next five years will focus on the artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductor field. In 2023, South Korea intends to establish an AI semiconductor data center, further expanding its advantage in this area. In the electric vehicle sector, South Korea introduced the fourth-phase New Energy Vehicle Development Plan (2021–2025) in 2021. The plan aims to increase the adoption of new energy vehicles, promote technological innovation, and target 7.85 million new energy vehicles by 2030, achieving a 24% reduction in automotive carbon emissions. Towards the end of 2021, South Korea also launched policies to accelerate the transition to green new energy vehicles, offering subsidies and incentives for new energy vehicles.

 

2.4 The emergence of bottleneck issues hindering the deepening development of industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea is becoming increasingly apparent.

 

2.4.1 There is an imbalance in China's economic and trade structures with Japan and South Korea. Concerning China and Japan, Japan is the largest source of imports for China's semiconductor wafer handling equipment, accounting for 27.1% of the total in 2021, according to data from the General Administration of Customs of China. This indicates a pronounced issue for China in terms of being dependent on Japan for semiconductor equipment and critical raw materials, creating a potential bottleneck. In the case of China and South Korea, their trade is overly reliant on semiconductors. South Korea's export share of semiconductors to China has significantly increased, rising from 3% in 2000 to 40% in 2021, as reported by the Federation of Korean Industries. Since the semiconductor industry undergoes rapid upgrades and faces substantial price fluctuations, the trade between the two countries is vulnerable to the cyclicality of the semiconductor industry.

 

2.4.2 The rising homogenous competition among China, Japan, and South Korea, coupled with a decrease in mutual complementarity. With the improvement of China's manufacturing capabilities, the industrial structures of China, Japan, and South Korea are becoming more similar, leading to increased homogenous competition and reduced mutual complementarity. In China's trade with Japan and South Korea, machinery and electronic products constitute the largest share of exports, showcasing strong export competitiveness. In their exports to China, machinery and electronic products account for approximately 50% for both Japan and South Korea. Intense competition is observed, particularly in the semiconductor industry. In the automotive sector, competition in the field of new energy vehicles has intensified among China, Japan, and South Korea. In recent years, all three countries have actively deployed policies to support the development of new energy vehicles and lithium batteries. Japan and South Korea, with their rich experience in energy conservation and emissions reduction, have been vigorous in promoting the development of new energy vehicles. China, with the largest user base of new energy vehicles globally and an early focus on policies in this sector, holds a certain competitive advantage and scale superiority. This intensifies the competition among China, Japan, and South Korea in the field of new energy vehicles. Competition in the digital economy sector has also grown, with China leading in this domain. South Korea is actively catching up, boasting global leadership in the commercial deployment of 5G. Although Japan has faced some delays in promoting digital industrialization and industrial digitization, it is making efforts to catch up. Therefore, as China, Japan, and South Korea further deepen economic and trade cooperation, finding new sources of growth becomes a challenge.

2.4.3 In recent years, non-economic factors in the global industrial shift pose significant challenges to industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea. Since the international financial crisis, there has been a new trend of "reverse transfer" in global industrial shifts. Countries such as the United States, Europe, and Japan have introduced plans for "reindustrialization" and "manufacturing revival," encouraging multinational enterprises to relocate or invest in domestic factories, forcing some industries to move from developing countries back to developed ones. The industries subjected to "reverse transfer" are often high-end manufacturing, aiming to further consolidate the technological advantages of developed countries and intensify global competition in emerging industries. Amid the China-U.S. rivalry, compounded by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine crisis, and the promotion of a values alliance, the reshaping of the global industrial chain by the West has exhibited a clear "de-China" characteristic. This trend reflects a general inclination in the West to decouple from China, with a noticeable feature of politically driven industrial transfer. The United States seeks to establish new technological standards and market rules under its leadership, aiming to reduce dependence on China in key industries, particularly in areas like photovoltaics, rare earths, semiconductors, and new energy vehicles, by intensifying joint containment efforts against China. Europe is strengthening the construction of digital sovereignty, focusing on developing a "carbon-neutral" industrial strategy and incorporating issues such as the environment, climate, and human rights into supply chain control, while enhancing investment scrutiny in high-tech industries. Japan and India are closely following U.S. policies, and South Korea is further aligning itself with the United States. Against this backdrop, China faces increased risks of industrial chain decoupling and potential disruptions in manufacturing. The difficulties in advancing deep industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea are amplified.

 

3. China, Japan, and South Korea face new opportunities for industrial cooperation.

In the midst of challenges, China, Japan, and South Korea must seize opportunities, enhance their ability to withstand external risks, assess risks and benefits, and continue to deepen cooperation in industrial and supply chains. Particularly, targeting the regional market to enhance the capacity for industrial chain upgrading is crucial. By solidifying the East Asian production network, the three nations can free themselves from the pain of being dominated by external forces.

 

3.1 The eastward shift of the global economic center promotes opportunities for the transformation of East Asian production methods.

The global COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of the East Asian production network, with China, Japan, and South Korea being indispensable nodes in this network. The natural geographical proximity of these countries, coupled with the advantages of the integration and development of industrial and supply chains, has led to a shared need to maintain the security, stability, and smooth operation of regional industrial and supply chains. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trend of the eastward shift of the global economic center has accelerated, manifesting in six major trends: eastward movement of global demand, supply, innovation, services, capital, and monetary and financial cooperation. This trend is driving the transformation of East Asian production methods from factor-driven to innovation-driven. It is shifting East Asia from providing manufacturing and labor for the global market to creating demand for the region and the world. It promotes strengthened cooperation in trade, production, innovation, services, finance, and shipping within the East Asian region. New industries, formats, models, and platforms continue to emerge. It propels cooperation in strategic emerging industries within the East Asian region, such as next-generation information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials, biopharmaceuticals, green low-carbon industries, and digital creativity. Collaboration includes strategic cooperation in the digitization transformation and intelligent manufacturing driven by digital technologies like big data, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. Moreover, it encompasses cooperation in new infrastructure projects such as 5G networks, artificial intelligence, big data centers, industrial internet platforms, as well as cooperation in new financial industries like digital finance, technology finance, inclusive finance, and green finance. All these developments bring new industries, formats, models, platforms, and opportunities to China, Japan, and South Korea, facilitating the transformation of East Asian production methods and the evolution of the collaboration model among the three countries.

 

3.2 Opportunities in Global Digital Economy and Green Low-Carbon Development.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is propelling the digital economy to become a new driving force for global economic development. According to predictions from the International Data Corporation (IDC), the global share of the digital economy's output will reach 62% by 2023, marking the entrance into the era of the digital economy globally. China holds enormous potential in the development of the digital economy and green low-carbon sectors. The scale of China's digital economy has grown significantly, from 11 trillion yuan in 2012 to 50.2 trillion yuan in 2022, consistently ranking as the world's second-largest for several years. China is actively creating the "Digital Silk Road" and "Green Silk Road," promoting cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea in the fields of the digital economy and low-carbon green initiatives. This collaboration aims to align the "Digital + Green" dual-axis policies of the three countries, facilitating cooperation in high-end manufacturing, technological innovation, the digital economy, and green low-carbon initiatives.

 

3.3 Opportunities in the Rapid Development of the Global Semiconductor Industry.

Currently, the global semiconductor market continues to show positive development momentum. According to McKinsey's forecast, the global semiconductor market is expected to reach $1 trillion by 2030, with 70% of the growth anticipated to come from the automotive, computing and data storage, and wireless industries. Technological development and market response in the Asia-Pacific region have become crucial drivers for the global semiconductor industry's growth. In 2022, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 58% of global semiconductor sales. Within this, the Chinese market maintains the most extensive and fastest-growing development, with semiconductor sales reaching $185.7 billion in 2022, representing 32% of global semiconductor sales. Although there was a 1.4% year-on-year decline compared to 2021, it remains the world's largest semiconductor market. The Americas, Europe, and Japan accounted for 24%, 9%, and 8%, respectively. Simultaneously, open collaboration remains the preferred model for the development of the semiconductor industry chain. Considering the global supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical uncertainties leading to a global chip shortage, open collaboration remains the most effective collective solution. Adhering to the open collaboration model will continue to be the preferred mode for the future development of the semiconductor industry chain.

 

3.4 Opportunities for Strengthening Regional Industry Chain and Supply Chain Cooperation.

The implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is conducive to reshaping and consolidating regional industry chains and supply chains. The rules of origin and preferential tariff treatments will enhance the trade links in intermediate goods between China, Japan, South Korea, and RCEP member countries. This is beneficial for promoting the smooth circulation of industries between China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN, collectively creating a stable and efficient regional industry chain and supply chain system. China's active alignment with high-standard international trade rules and comprehensive expansion of high-level openness to the outside world contribute to elevating the level of cooperation in East Asian industry chains and supply chains. This will create more demand, application scenarios, and opportunities for cooperation in industrial collaboration between China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as within the regional industry.

 

4. The Train of Thought, Principles, and Paths for Industrial Cooperation Among China, Japan, and South Korea in the New Situation

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China reiterated China's commitment to a foreign policy of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness towards neighboring countries. It aims to deepen friendship, mutual trust, and integration of interests with neighboring countries. In the current complex international environment, it has some impact on China-Japan and China-South Korea industrial cooperation. The governments of both sides should adapt to the new requirements of the times and inject new connotations into their cooperation. In the new circumstances, China, Japan, and South Korea should take the consensus of their leaders and the opportunities presented by the 50th anniversary of China-Japan diplomatic relations and the 30th anniversary of China-South Korea diplomatic relations to jointly usher in a new era of industrial cooperation. Both sides should break free from the constraints of traditional cooperation models, explore new areas of collaboration, and cultivate and strengthen new growth points.

 

4.1 Jointly Safeguarding the Stability among China, Japan and -South Korea Economic and Trade Relations.

The development achievements of China-Japan and China-South Korea economic and trade relations are hard-won, and both sides should cherish and persist in maintaining the stability of their bilateral economic and trade relations. It is essential to enhance political mutual trust, abandon zero-sum games, take care of each other's core interests and major concerns, and actively promote the positive development of China-Japan and China-South Korea relations. Strengthening dialogue and communication at various levels, establishing multi-level dialogue and exchange platforms, and institutionalizing and normalizing dialogue mechanisms are crucial. Additionally, there should be an emphasis on enhancing strategic economic dialogue, facilitating policy communication, and pragmatically promoting bilateral industrial investment cooperation, finding more points of common interest. Simultaneously, leveraging the role of business leaders is crucial for expanding bilateral trade and investment cooperation. This involves advancing practical cooperation between the two sides. Furthermore, making full use of the roles played by Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean think tanks in second-track dialogue and exchange cooperation platforms is essential. This will facilitate interaction between governments and enterprises, provide advice and suggestions for government decision-making, promote cultural exchanges between the two countries, encourage mutual learning, enhance mutual understanding, consolidate the public opinion foundation for bilateral cooperation, and work together to promote regional stability and prosperity.

 

4.2 Promoting China's Industries to Ascend to the High-End of the Global Value Chain.

In recent years, the division of labor in China, Japan, and South Korea has evolved from vertical specialization to horizontal collaboration. While China's industrial structure has become more similar to that of Japan and South Korea, there is still a significant gap in terms of rationalization and high-end development. Currently, China's manufacturing industry is large but not strong, with its industrial structure predominantly situated in the mid-to-low end of the value chain. China faces challenges such as insufficient independent innovation capabilities and pressing issues like the lack of core technologies and weak industrial foundations. The "shortage of chips," particularly high-end chips, poses a serious obstacle to industrial upgrading. Moreover, the prolonged geopolitical competition between China and the United States continues to exert sustained pressure on China's industrial upgrading. To address these challenges and promote China's industrial upgrading, it is crucial to leverage the high-end advantages of Japanese and South Korean industries in the global value chain. Strengthening cooperation with Japan and South Korea in high-tech fields can drive China's industries toward transformation and upgrading, capitalizing on the respective strengths of China, Japan, and South Korea. This can be achieved through industrial complementarity, differentiated development, collaborative research and development, and the provision of shared application scenarios. By enhancing cooperation in third-party markets and other forms, it is possible to stimulate practical collaboration in key industrial sectors, propelling China's industries to ascend to the high-end of the global value chain.

 

4.3 Basic Principles for Promoting Industrial Cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea.

In the new situation, advancing industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea should adhere to basic principles to engage and cooperate with Japan and South Korea. Considering the mutually interwoven and closely connected characteristics of the industrial chains among China, Japan, and South Korea in the East Asian region, it is essential to identify points of mutually beneficial cooperation, enhance the stickiness of the industrial chain, maintain linkage without decoupling, and leverage China's advantage of continuously opening its highly open domestic market to meet the rising demand for consumption upgrades. This will expand the broader space for industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea.

 

4.3.1 Implement a more proactive open strategy by opening wide the doors, adhering to peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit. Deepen bilateral, multilateral, and regional cooperation, expand high-level opening-up, promote international cooperation, encourage domestic enterprises to go global, and steadily advance the internationalization process.

 

4.3.2 Adhere to the principle of "complementary cooperation in industries, differentiated development." Exploit the significant cooperation potential in traditional industries, emerging industries, and the service sector by fully leveraging the complementary nature of the industrial structures of China, Japan, and South Korea, which is more complementary than competitive.

 

4.3.3 Strengthen strategic binding and interest entanglement with Japan and South Korea. Further enhance trade and investment cooperation with Japan and South Korea, intensify all-round cooperation in fields such as the digital economy, green low-carbon initiatives, medical and health, vaccine and innovative drug research and development, technological innovation, and cultural exchanges. Promote close cooperation between companies, deepen interest integration, actively advance trilateral cooperation in third-party markets, initiate efforts from surrounding markets, and commence with high-quality construction of the "Belt and Road," gradually elevating the international cooperation level among China, Japan, and South Korea, assisting local economic and social development, and achieving mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.

 

4.3.4 Strengthen implicit coordination and consensus. Facing the downward pressure on the global economy and the risks of the contraction of global industrial chain supply chains, China, Japan, and South Korea should enhance coordination in industrial policies, work together for mutual assistance, overcome challenges together, comprehensively strengthen cooperation, deepen collaborative division of labor, enhance the resilience of industrial chain supply chains, maintain a low profile in transnational cooperative actions, and advance substantive cooperation and the implementation of existing projects. This will ensure the steady progress of industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea, and contribute to the recovery of the world economy.

 

4.4 Five Paths for Advancing Trilateral Cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea in the New Situation.

In the new situation, the design of pathways for advancing industrial cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea should consider how to avoid or break through U.S. obstruction. It should achieve new progress in key industrial cooperation with Japan and South Korea while serving the strategic upgrading of China's industries.

 

4.4.1 Leverage China's large market and production capacity advantages. Enable China to contribute to global economic growth and become a crucial investment destination for international capital. Strengthen China-Japan-South Korea trade and investment cooperation to continue playing a stabilizing role in the bilateral relationship.

 

4.4.2 Accelerate the construction of an industry chain and supply chain system led by China. Exploit China's advantage of having the world's most complete manufacturing supply chain system, quickly fill in the gaps in domestic industry chain, supply chain, and innovation chain, and focus on consolidating, strengthening, extending, and supplementing the chains. Realize the independent and efficient core industry chain of China's manufacturing, promote the rapid ascent of the industrial chain to higher value-added segments in the global value chain. Efforts should be made to enhance the basic capabilities and supply chain levels of core enterprises, actively integrate into the global supply chain system, vigorously promote the overseas layout of China's supply chain, actively cultivate a globally influential supply chain network system, and accelerate the construction of a global supply chain network led by China.

 

4.4.3 Strengthen deep cooperation with the industrial chains and supply chains of Japan and South Korea. Taking the RCEP rules as a guide and focusing on cooperation in emerging industries such as new energy, new energy vehicles, semiconductors, and smart manufacturing, prioritize two-way investment projects. Utilize platforms such as China-Japan-South Korea industrial expos to attract and serve Japanese and Korean companies in China, deepening ties with the industrial chains and supply chains of Japan and South Korea.

 

4.4.4 To advance industrial cooperation under the RCEP framework: Leverage the dividends of RCEP implementation to jointly promote the world's largest free trade area cooperation. Fully explore the complementary potential of regional industrial chain and supply chain advantages, promote cooperation and integration of regional industrial chain and supply chain, and maintain the safety, stability, and smooth operation of regional industrial chain and supply chain. Jointly promote technological innovation cooperation within the region. Establish globally-oriented research and development centers and innovation centers, enhance regional innovation advantages, and elevate the global value chain's status. Actively explore new models of industrial cooperation under the RCEP framework. Promote cooperation in industrial parks under the RCEP framework, using the construction of international cooperative industrial parks as a starting point. Pave the way for opening up innovative systems, advance industrial cooperation and urban integration development between China, Japan, and South Korea. Construct future technology parks and modern industrial parks that are open, innovative, green, low-carbon, and smart. Utilize industrial cooperation platforms as a link to enhance the resilience of the regional industrial chain and supply chain. Simultaneously, encourage enterprises from China, Japan, and South Korea to make effective use of RCEP preferential tariffs, rules of origin accumulation, and other principles. Further expand trade and investment cooperation among China, Japan, South Korea, and RCEP members. Particularly, explore new space for cooperation in third-party markets under the RCEP framework, consolidate ongoing projects in third-party markets among China, Japan, and South Korea. Steadily expand cooperation into new areas and deepen the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) cooperation under the "China-Japan-South Korea + X" framework.

 

4.4.5 Enhance the ability to deal with U.S. "long-arm jurisdiction." Further improve foreign-related laws and regulatory systems, enhance China's legal discourse system in foreign affairs, continuously improve China's version of "blocking statutes," counteract U.S. "extraterritorial jurisdiction," protect Chinese companies from U.S. sanctions, enact strict personal data protection regulations, and increase the cost for U.S. courts to obtain personal information data.

 

4.5 Seeking Key Areas for Industrial Cooperation to Achieve Mutual Benefits.

Leveraging the industrial advantages of Japan and South Korea in areas such as semiconductors, automobiles, digital economy, green and low-carbon initiatives, health and elderly care, and cultural exchanges, there are opportunities to find common ground for industrial cooperation and elevate the development level and space for Chinese industries.

 

4.5.1 Strengthening complementary cooperation in the semiconductor industry:

In the semiconductor industry chain, China, Japan, and South Korea play crucial roles and exhibit high interdependence. Japan and South Korea specialize in high-end chip technologies, with Japan excelling in semiconductor equipment and materials globally, and South Korea possessing a complete semiconductor industry chain and supply chain but lacking critical materials. On the other hand, China leads in global chip design, has a strong momentum in packaging, and can provide a vast market scale for semiconductors worldwide, although it lacks independent key core technologies. China remains the largest global semiconductor market, with approximately 30% of global semiconductor enterprise revenues coming from China in 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, under the RCEP framework, China, Japan, and South Korea are set to gradually eliminate tariffs on over 90% of goods, including certain semiconductor equipment and materials. This significantly reduces the collaboration costs for semiconductor enterprises in these countries. Given the flourishing digital economy, China, Japan, and South Korea should further enhance cooperation in the semiconductor industry, especially in areas such as integrated circuit equipment and materials. Strengthening collaboration along the semiconductor industry chain and supply chain will achieve mutual complementarity and win-win results.

 

4.5.2 Enhancing Cooperation in the Automotive Industry.

China, Japan, and South Korea have early-stage development in the field of new energy vehicles. Japan has rich experience and mature technology in hydrogen fuel vehicles, while South Korea excels in electric vehicles and initiatives for carbon emission reduction in the automotive sector. However, both Japan and South Korea face challenges related to the lack of application scenarios and relatively small consumer markets. China, with its ability to provide a stage for new technologies and products, can play a crucial role in addressing these challenges. In the current context, China, Japan, and South Korea can leverage their technological compatibility and complementary advantages to actively collaborate in the fields of new energy vehicles and smart automobiles. On the one hand, this collaboration can drive the development of new energy vehicles and mid-to-high-end automobiles in China. On the other hand, it can promote the exchange of smart connected vehicle technologies among the three countries, facilitate cooperation on technologies for reducing carbon emissions in automobiles, and steer future collaboration in the automotive industry of China, Japan, and South Korea towards long-term coexistence and mutual promotion. This will contribute to achieving development goals such as energy conservation and emission reduction.

 

4.5.3 Advancing International Cooperation in Digital Transformation.

In the process of digital transformation and upgrading, China, Japan, and South Korea share common needs and enormous potential for collaboration. Japan is actively leveraging digital technology to drive its Society 5.0 strategy, aiming to improve productivity, address aging population issues, narrow education gaps, and revitalize local economies. South Korea is prioritizing digital transformation and upgrade, focusing on initiatives like the Digital Dam, smart government, and the construction of a secure national society. China is accelerating its digital development, promoting industrial digitization, nurturing the digital industry, vigorously developing the digital economy, building a digital society, and constructing a Digital China. In the current situation, strengthening cooperation in the digital economy among China, Japan, and South Korea should adhere to the principle of prioritizing both development and security. Collaboration should continue to be reinforced in areas such as digital epidemic prevention and control, digital infrastructure construction, industrial digital transformation, smart city development, cyberspace governance, and network security.

 

4.5.4 Promoting International Cooperation in Green and Low-Carbon Initiatives.

China, Japan, and South Korea share similar needs in the development of green and low-carbon initiatives. Japan is committed to building a decarbonized society, while South Korea is accelerating its transition to a low-carbon society. China is striving to follow a development path for green and low-carbon initiatives that suits its national conditions, with specific targets set for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, 2050 and 2060, respectively. The common goals in green and low-carbon development among China, Japan, and South Korea provide an opportunity to deepen practical cooperation in this field. Efforts should be concentrated on enhancing industrial collaboration in areas such as climate change, environmental pollution, and energy development. This can be achieved by advancing collaboration among businesses, fostering technological cooperation, and facilitating exchanges among professionals in these domains.

 

4.5.5 Advancing Cooperation in Healthcare, Elderly Care, and people-to-people exchanges.

China, Japan and the South Korea all face common social issues such as healthy and elderly care, which is conducive to the three countries to explore the establishment of a long-term mechanism for healthy elderly care cooperation, promote the exchange of experience and research cooperation on healthy elderly care, create best practices for healthy elderly care and promote them globally, and promote global cooperation on healthy elderly care. We need to strengthen cooperation in system building, personnel training, product research and development, management and services of elderly care institutions, assistions for the elderly and smart equipment manufacturing, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation in culture, education, sports, tourism, media, film and television, youth and other fields, so as to foster a new pattern of people-to-people and cultural exchanges, enhance mutual understanding between the two peoples and consolidate popular support for bilateral exchanges.